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Abstract Why did England industrialize ﬁrst? And why was Europe ahead of the
rest of the world? Uniﬁed growth theory in the tradition of Galor and Weil (2000,
American Economic Review, 89, 806–828) and Galor and Moav (2002, Quartely Jour-
nal of Economics, 177(4), 1133–1191) captures the key features of the transition from
stagnation to growth over time. Yet we know remarkably little about why industri-
alization occurred much earlier in some parts of the world than in others. To answer
this question, we present a probabilistic two-sector model where the initial escape
from Malthusian constraints depends on the demographic regime, capital deepen-
ing and the use of more differentiated capital equipment. Weather-induced shocks
to agricultural productivity cause changes in prices and quantities, and affect wages.
In a standard model with capital externalities, these ﬂuctuations interact with the
demographic regime and affect the speed of growth. Our model is calibrated to match
the main characteristics of the English economy in 1700 and the observed transition
until 1850. We capture one of the key features of the British Industrial Revolution
emphasized by economic historians — slow growth of output and productivity. Fertil-
ity limitation is responsible for higher per capita incomes, and these in turn increase
industrialization probabilities. The paper also explores the availability of nutrition for
poorer segments of society. We examine the inﬂuence of redistributive institutions
such as the Old Poor Law, and ﬁnd they were not decisive in fostering industrializa-
tion. Simulations using parameter values for other countries show that Britain’s early
escape was only partly due to chance. France could have moved out of agriculture
and into manufacturing faster than Britain, but the probability was less than 25%.
Contrary to recent claims in the literature, 18th century China had only a minimal
chance to escape from Malthusian constraints.
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1 Introduction
Britain was the ﬁrst country to break free from Malthusian constraints, with popu-
lation size and living standards starting to grow in tandem after 1750 (Crafts, 1985;
Wrigley,1983).Inmanypartsoftheworld,however,growthratesofpercapitaincome
took a long time to accelerate. Eventually, more and more countries industrialized,
ﬁrst in Europe and North America, and from the 20th century onwards in other areas
of the globe. The relative size of economies, the onset of the demographic transi-
tion, and living standards of citizens are still profoundly inﬂuenced by the timing of
Industrial Revolutions around the globe (Galor & Mountford, 2003) — with dramatic
consequences for the economic and political history of the world that are still felt
today world.
Why did some countries industrialize so much earlier than others? Uniﬁed growth
theory (Galor & Weil, 2000; Galor & Moav, 2002; Hansen & Prescott, 2002; Jones,
2001) offers a consistent explanation for the transition from century-long Malthusian
stagnation to rapid growth. What is missing is a better understanding of why some
countries overcame stagnation at radically different points in time. The question is
almostasoldasindustrializationitself.Economichistorianshavestressedalonglistof
factors, ranging from the property rights regime to the land tenure system, that might
have favored Britain (Landes, 1999). Galor (2005) argues that geographical factors
and historical accident interacted to delay or accelerate the timing of the “Great
Escape,” and that “variations in institutional, demographic, and cultural factors, trade
patterns, colonial status, and public policy” may have playeda role. This paperaims to
provide a systematic answer to the questions “Why England?” and “Why Europe?”
In doing so, it offers clear quantitative evidence on the role of starting conditions and
the nature of constraints that delayed industrialization for centuries in many parts of
the world.
In our model, chance can play an important role. Industrialization is treated as the
result of a probabilistic process. During the late medieval and early modern period,
brief expansions — “efﬂorescences” — occurred in many countries (Braudel, 1973;
Goldstone, 2002). Yet most of these growth episodes sooner or later ground to a halt.
Some advanced economies (such as the Italian Republics) went into decline, while
countries like the Netherlands stagnated at high income levels. This is why economic
historians have often been sceptical of industrialization theories where the ﬁnal out-
come is pre-determined (Clark, 2003a; Mokyr & Voth, 2008). What explains these
starts and stops? And could other countries have succeeded before Britain? Crafts
(1977) argued that accidental factors, and not systematic advantages, may have been
crucial — that France, for example, could have easily industrialized ﬁrst had it not
been for a number of random factors. To examine the determinants of early economic
development, this paper develops a simple stochastic model of the ﬁrst Industrial
Revolution — the transition from the Malthusian to the post-Malthusian regime, in
the terminology of uniﬁed growth theory. In the spirit of Stokey (2001), our model is
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role in the timing and speed of Britain’s initial surge — it’s actual performance was
in the upper half of the expected range of outcomes in our model. By altering the
parameters of the calibrated model, we derive probabilities of the escape in other
parts of the world. France could have experienced substantial growth, based on our
model, but the manufacturing employment share in 1850 is lower than in Britain in
most of our simulations.
As emphasized by Galor and Moav (2004), physical capital accumulation is crucial
for the ﬁrst transition. This is reﬂected in our model, which emphasizes TFP advances
as a result of growing capital inputs. The key factors inﬂuencing industrialization
probabilities in our model are starting incomes, the nature of shocks, inequality, and
the demographic regime. In our calibrations, we ﬁnd that England’s (and Europe’s)
chancesofsustainedgrowthweregreaterprincipallybecausethedemographicregime
propped up initial incomes. Redistribution plays only a small role. Galor and Moav
(2004) argue that inequality should be beneﬁcial for industrialization in its initial
stages, when physical capital is crucial; during the second transition to self-sustaining
growth, human capital becomes a key input, and inequality is harmful. Zweimüller
(2000) shows how, in an endogenous growth model, redistribution can be growth-
enhancing, while Matsuyama (2002) demonstrates how development depends on the
exact shape of the income distribution. We add another dimension emphasized by
Fogel (1994). As many as 20% of the population in 18th century France possibly did
not receive enough food to work for more than a few hours a day. Also, when inequal-
itywastoogreatpriortotheIndustrialRevolution,crisismortalitycouldbehigh.This
undermines growth by lowering the marginal return to capital, and the pace of accu-
mulation. If this effect is larger than the rise in the capital/labor and land/labor ratios
due to falling population, productivity growth suffers. We conclude that inequality
may only be beneﬁcial via the savings channel if the population is sufﬁciently well-fed
to avoid famines and chronic undernutrition.
Our work is related to three bodies of literature. Economic historians have some-
times been sceptical of endogenous growth models.1 Crafts (1995) rejected them
partly because they had little to say about the different speeds of industrialization in
EnglandandFrance.Healsoarguedthatdetailedaccountsoftechnologicalhistorians
did not square with the predictions of endogeneous growth models. Uniﬁed growth
theory has made considerable progress in bridging the gap between theory and his-
toricalfacts.WethereforetakethemodelsbyGalorandMoav(2002),GalorandWeil
(2000), Jones (2001), Kögel and Prskawetz (2001) and Cervellati and Sunde (2005) as
our starting point. Our model focuses on what Galor et al. call the ﬁrst of two crucial
transitions — the one from Malthusian to a post-Malthusian world, when population
pressure no longer determines wages (but before human capital becomes crucial). In
the vein of these models, demographic feedback and physical capital accumulation
are important for the initial escape from stagnation. While papers in the Galor-Weil
traditionfocusonfertilitylimitationaftertheﬁrsttransition,weemphasizetheimpor-
tance of fertility behavior for starting conditions in Europe (as in the work of Wrigley
(1988), inter alia).
A second set of related papers emphasizes technology adoption. Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1989a,b) argue that bigger markets and moderate inequality facilitate
the adoption of new technologies when ﬁxed costs are substantial. The technological
1 Voth(2003)concludedthat“theIndustrialRevolutioninmostgrowthmodelssharesfewsimilarities
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history of the First Industrial Revolution only offers qualiﬁed support for the
importance of ﬁxed costs and indivisibilities. Instead, we employ an externality to
capital use that is based on the ﬁndings of technological historians (Mokyr, 1990). As
in Kögel and Prskawetz (2001), we emphasize the interactions between agricultural
productivity and industrial growth — an approach that goes back in economic his-
tory to Gilboy (1932). Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) observe that volatility in poor
economies is high. New technologies represent high risk, high return investment. Be-
cause of indivisibilities, only richer and larger countries undertake them. A run of
“good years” increases the probability of switching to high-productivity projects. In
our model, stochastic income ﬂuctuations and starting per capita income play a role
because they increase the scope for the capital externality to work.
The third body of literature uses calibrations and simulation methods to shed
new light on the industrialization process. Stokey (2001) was amongst the ﬁrst to
employ calibrations for the Industrial Revolution. She concludes that foreign trade
and technological change in manufacturing were equally important for growth, but
that improvements in energy production mattered less. Crafts and Harley (2000)
examine the importance of broad-based technological change in a CGE model, and
conclude that slow, sector-speciﬁc improvements in TFP are compatible with the
observed pattern of trade. Lagerlöf (2003) uses a probabilistic model where mortality
ﬂuctuations — epidemics — eventually lead to a transition to self-sustaining growth.
Lagerlöf (2006) simulates the Galor-Weil model, and ﬁnds that it can replicate most
of the important features in the transition from stagnation to growth. Our approach
differs from the Stokey approach in that it uses a more explicit model of productivity
change.Wecombinethecalibrationexercisewiththeprobabilisticmodelsinthespirit
of Lagerlöf (2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical context and moti-
vation for the paper. It brieﬂy highlights where existing uniﬁed growth models are in
conﬂict with the historical record, and sets out the basic elements of our story. Section
3 presents the model, explaining the role of demographic factors and the productiv-
ity beneﬁts of differentiated capital inputs. In the next part, we calibrate the model
and derive comparative industrialization probabilities for Britain, France, and China.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical background and motivation
We focus on three features of the First Industrial Revolution — the slow, gradual
nature of productivity growth and structural change, the role of inequality, and the
nature of technological advances. Research in economic history over the last three
decades has emphasized the slow and gradual nature of economic and structural
change after 1750. Where once scholars argued for a few decades during which the
transition to rapid growth occurred, a much more gradualist orthodoxy has taken
hold (Crafts & Harley, 1992; Antras & Voth, 2003). As Table 1 shows, total factor
productivity growth rates were barely higher after 1750 than before. What is remark-
able about the period after 1750 in Britain is not output growth or TFP performance
as such, but the fact that accelerated population growth coincided with stagnant or
slowly growing wages and output per head (Mokyr, 1999) — which makes the term
“post-Malthusian” (Galor, 2005) particularly apt. During the period, and in line withJ Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 323
Table 1 Output and
productivity growth during the
industrial revolution
(percent Feinstein Crafts Crafts & Antras &
per annum) (1981) (1985) Harley Voth
(1992) (2003)
Output
1760-1800 1.1 1 1
1801-1831 2.7 2 1.9
1831-60 2.5 2.5 2.5
Productivity (TFP)
1760-1800 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.27
1801-1831 1.3 0.7 0.35 0.54
1831-1860 0.8 1 0.8 0.33
uniﬁed growth theory, investment rates increased from about 7% of GDP in 1760 to
14% in 1840 (Crafts, 1985).
One implication of the gradualist school of thought is that per capita living stan-
dards in Britain must have been quite high by 1750 already. This underlines the
importanceofstartingconditions.Onemajorfactorwasthenatureofitsdemographic
regime. As Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) have argued, social and cultural norms lim-
ited fertility in early modern England in a way that few other societies did. This led
to higher per capita incomes. England practiced an extreme form of the ‘European
marriage pattern’ — West of a line from St. Petersburg to Triest, age at ﬁrst marriage
for women was determined by socioeconomic conditions, not age at ﬁrst menarche
(Hajnal, 1965). This stabilized per capita living standards and avoided the waste of
resources and human lives resulting from Malthus’ ‘positive’ check, when population
declines through widespread starvation. Within the European context, England was
characterized by a low-pressure demographic regime — negative shocks to income
were mainly absorbed by falls in fertility rather than increases in mortality (Wrigley
& Schoﬁeld, 1981; Wrigley, Davies, Oeppen, & Schoﬁeld, 1997). Both the higher level
of per capita income produced by this demographic regime, and the way in which it
was achieved, play a crucial role in our model.
Second,Britainwasahighlyunequalsocietyinthe17thand18thcentury(Lindert&
Williamson, 1982; Lindert, 2000). Nonetheless, average British standards of consump-
tion were relatively high compared to French ones, with a markedly higher minimum
level of consumption. Fogel (1994) estimated that as a result of higher inequality and
lower per capita output, the bottom 20–30% of the French population did not receive
enough food to perform more than a few hours of work. This was partly a result of
higher productivity overall — Fogel calculates that the British consumed some 17%
more calories than their French counterparts. Yet the crucial factor may have been
support for the poorer parts of society. The Old Poor Law was an unusually generous
form of redistribution. At its peak, transfers amounted to 2.5% of British GDP, and
more than 11% of the population received some form of relief. This may also have
had indirect effects for the wages of those who were not recipients, by reducing com-
petition in the labor market and raising the aggregate wage bill (Boyer, 1990). Mokyr
(2002) calculates that at its peak the system may have boosted average incomes of the
bottom 40% of society by 14–25%. This ensured that in England, most individuals
were sufﬁciently well-fed to work. It may have also stabilized consumer demand for
industrial products. Even during the 1790s, when food prices were high, up to 30%324 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
of working class budgets continued to be spent on non-food items (with 6% going
on clothing). With most of the goods produced by the nascent modern sector having
high income elasticities of demand (in excess of 2.3), even modest gains in real wages
in the later stages of the Industrial Revolution could translate into rapidly growing
purchases of manufacturing goods. Finally, because of the large absolute value of
the own-price elasticity of non-food spending (of −1.8 amongst the English poor),
productivity increases and subsequent price reductions facilitated the growth of the
modern sector (Horrell, 1996).
The third element in our story emphasizes the relative importance of innovation
versus inventions. Traditionally, economic historians in the tradition of North and
Thomas (1973) have emphasized the importance of property rights, especially the
patent system. In this view, as the security of property rights improved after the Glo-
rious Revolution in 1688, more inventive activity took place. Technological change
accelerated. The problem with this interpretation is that intellectual property rights
werepoorlyprotectedbeforethe19thcenturyinEngland,thatfewinventorsreceived
substantial material rewards, that the role of traditional (“feudal”) forms of reward
like grants from Parliament dominated beneﬁts from patents, and that non-monetary
incentives and chance seem to have played an extraordinarily large part in many
of the key breakthroughs. Most of the technologies that made Britain great in 1850
were already known a century before. As Mokyr (1990) has emphasized, the crucial
breakthroughs did not take the shape of blueprints or ideas. Instead, a stream of
microinventions gave the First Industrial Nation its edge:
“InBritain,[...]theprivatesectoronitsowngeneratedthetechnologicalbreak-
throughs and, more importantly, adapted and improved these breakthroughs
throughacontinuousstreamofsmall,anonymousmicroinventionswhichcumu-
latively accounted for the gains in productivity.” (Mokyr, 1990)
New ways of adapting and making useful existing technologies were crucial. The
Watt steam engine was but a variation of the Newcomen design. Many productiv-
ity advances were embodied in better pieces of capital equipment (Mokyr, 1990).
What made these advances possible was not a small group of heroic inventors but a
small labor aristocracy of highly skilled craftsmen, perhaps no more than 5% of the
workforce overall (Mokyr & Voth, 2008). These glass-cutters, instrument makers, and
specialists in ﬁne mechanics were crucial in turning ideas into working prototypes, or
existing machines into reliable capital equipment.
Industrialization occurs in our model in the following way: Incomes ﬂuctuate
around their long-run trend, pinned down by the demographic regime in the pre-
industrial era. Technology improves but slowly through the use of capital itself — the
more manufacturing activity there is, the more scope there is for improving and reﬁn-
ing existing designs. The higher pre-industrial incomes, the greater the chance that a
positive,persistentshockleadstoalargeincreaseinmanufacturingoutput.Thehigher
manufacturing output, the more capital-intensive production overall becomes — and
the greater the scope for an acceleration of productivity growth because of growing
differentiation of capital inputs. This setup resolves the apparent incompatibility of
endogenous growth models with the history of technology which was emphasized
by Crafts (1995). One of the key criticisms of long-run growth models by economic
historians has been that they often imply important and large scale effects — and
that countries with bigger markets should have industrialized ﬁrst (Crafts, 1995). Yet
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most of the period before 1750. We deliberately avoid these pitfalls by offering a
mechanism for industrialization that does not presume that bigger countries have an
automatic advantage.2
Population grows in response to higher wages; positive shocks to income add to
demographic pressures, but also increase the scope for the capital externality to work.
Crucially, because of fertility limitation, Europe’s birth rates never outpace the rate
of capital accumulation. We argue that England in particular (and Europe in general)
hadahigherchancetoundergoatransitionbecauseofthehighinitialstartingincomes
and a favorable demographic regime.
For our argument to hold, England had to be ahead of the rest of Europe — and
Europe markedly ahead of the rest of the world — in terms of per capita income. This
is not accepted with unanimity. Pomeranz (2000) argues that, in the Yangtze region
in China, living standards were broadly similar with the most advanced regions in
Europe, and that the “great divergence” between Asia and Europe was a result of
industrialization. Broadberry and Gupta (2005a) have recently shown that Pomer-
anz’s claims, even for the Yangtze area, are probably exaggerated. Allen (2005a) ﬁnds
that because of low rice and grain prices, the standard of living in Asia and Europe
was broadly similar. However, money wages were markedly lower, and the relative
priceofmanufacturinggoodsmuchhigher.Thisiscompatiblewithourinterpretation,
since it hinges on the purchasing power of income not dedicated to food.
3 The model
This section sets out the basic setup of our model. The economy is composed of
inﬁnitely lived, identical households whose members work, consume, invest, and pro-
create. Households choose consumption and saving to maximize their dynastic utility,
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. We consider a representative house-
hold of size N. In the following, we will refer to N as population and to household
members as consumers or individuals. Current family members expect N to grow at
the rate γN(·) because of the net inﬂuences of fertility and mortality, depending on
consumption.Ineveryperiodtheeconomyproducestwotypesofconsumptiongoods:
foodand manufacturingproducts— as well as investment goodsin the form of capital
varieties. Output is produced using land, labor, and the accumulated stock of capital
varieties. Consumers’ preferences are non-homothetic: Representing Engel’s law, the
share of manufacturing expenditures grows with income. Below, we describe each of
these elements of our model in turn.
3.1 Consumers
Each household member supplies one unit of labor in every period. Families use their
income for investment, and to consume an agricultural good (cA) and a manufac-
tured good (cM). Households maximize their expected life-time utility in a two-stage
2 Uniﬁed growth theory models in the spirit of Galor-Weil do not predict that bigger countries should
industrialize ﬁrst. Rather, their unit of observation is the world, and they assume that the partial
derivative of technological change with respect to population size is positive. At this level of aggrega-
tion, economic historians cannot disagree. The difﬁculty appears to be that for a model that captures
cross-sectional differences, factors other than size must be important, and it is these factors that we
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decision. In an intertemporal optimization problem, they decide upon consumption
expenditure per household member in a given period t, et. In the second stage, the
intra-temporaloptimization,eachindividualtakeset asgivenandmaximizesinstanta-
neous utility. We consider the second stage ﬁrst. The corresponding budget constraint
is cA,t+pM,tcM,t ≤ et,w h e r epM,t is the price of a manufactured good. The agricultural
good serves as the numeraire. Before they begin to demand manufactured goods,
individuals need to consume a minimum quantity of food, c. Preferences take the
Stone–Geary form and imply the composite consumption index:
u(cA,cM) = (cA − c)αc1−α
M (1)
Given et, consumers maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint. This yields the
following equation for the expenditure share on agricultural products:
cA,t
et






In a poor economy, where income is just enough to ensure subsistence consumption
c, all expenditure goes to food. As people become richer and et grows, the share of
spending on food falls, in line with Engel’s law. For very high levels of expenditure,
c/et converges to zero and the agricultural expenditure share converges to α,w h i c h
can thus be considered the food expenditure share in a rich economy.
We now turn to intertemporal optimization. First, we derive the indirect utility of
consumers from (1) and (2):









We use this result to set up the intertemporal optimization problem. The represen-
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yt = wt + rL,tl + RK,tpK,tkt (4)
where yt, et, kt,a n dl are per-capita income, consumption expenditure, capital, and
land, respectively, and pK,t is the price of capital.3 Factor returns are the gross cap-
ital interest rate RK, wage w, and the land rental rate rL. Capital depreciates at
rate δ; β ∈ (0,1) is the households’ discount rate, and 1/ψ gives the (constant) elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution, where ψ ≥ 1. Since families take care of the
welfare and resources of their prospective descendants, individual instantaneous util-
ity
 
  u(·)1−ψ − 1
 
/(1 − ψ) is multiplied by household members N. Households take
populationgrowthγN,t asgivenwhenoptimizing.Togetherwiththebudgetconstraint,
(4) yields the Euler equation
3 In our model capital is the collection of varieties (machines). Thus, total capital K = kN is equal
to the integral over all capital varieties used in the economy. We provide a formal description of the
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The Euler equation is the standard one, except for the two price terms on the right-
hand side. If the price of manufactured goods increases, consumption in the next
period will be more expensive. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low
(i.e., ψ>1), the income effect will outweigh the substitution effect, and consumption
et will be lower. If the price of capital pK is expected to increase, investment is shifted
from the future to the present, also lowering today’s consumption. We use policy
function iteration to solve the Euler equation, as described in Appendix A.6.
3.2 Production
Firms produce both capital and ﬁnal goods. The latter are either agricultural or man-
ufactured, are homogenous, and are produced under perfect competition. Capital
is non-homogenous. It comes in many varieties that are produced monopolistically
subject to increasing returns. The efﬁciency of production depends on the number of
capital goods varieties. Free entry in the capital-goods producing sector ensures that,
in equilibrium, there are no proﬁts.
3.2.1 Final goods
Final sector ﬁrms use labor N,l a n dL, and capital in the form of varieties j ∈[ 0,J] to
produce their output. The agricultural production function is
YA = AA









where AA is a productivity parameter in agriculture and νA(j) is the amount of capital
variety j used for agricultural production in a representative ﬁnal sector ﬁrm. Produc-
tivity ﬂuctuates over time: AA,t = ztAA,t, where the component zt represents a shock
withmeanone.Theshockparameterzt followstheAR(1)processlnzt = θ lnzt−1+εt





. To capture the growth of agricultural pro-
ductivityoverthelongtermevenbeforetheIndustrialRevolution,welettheefﬁciency
parameter grow at rate γA, such that AA,t+1 = (1 + γA)AA,t. The shocks εt should be
interpreted as caused by weather conditions rather than changes in technology (as in
Gilboy, 1932).4 Production becomes more efﬁcient if more varieties of capital goods
j are available. These enter with the (constant) elasticity of substitution (1 +  )/ ,
where  >0. Land is a ﬁxed factor of production.
Manufacturing production is given by
YM = AM









4 The abundance or shortage of seed as well as the effect of storage on price in periods following
good or bad harvests causes the autocorrelation of output (McCloskey & Nash, 1984).328 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
where AM is a productivity parameter, and νM(j) is the amount of capital variety j
used to produce manufacturing output in a representative ﬁnal sector ﬁrm.5
3.2.2 Capital
Technological progress takes the form of a growing variety of machines available for
production. There are j types of capital. Each of them allows a ﬁrm to perform a
speciﬁc task. The more specialized machinery is, the higher productivity in ﬁnal goods
production.6 Asthenumberofvarietiesgrows,machinesthatarebetter-suitedtoeach
production task become available.
Producers borrow capital from consumers, and pay interest at rate rK = RK − δ.
Producers replace depreciated capital while production occurs.7 T h ep r i c eo fav a r i e t y
is p(j).T h e r ea r eν(j) items of type j machines available. Representative ﬁnal sector
ﬁrms then use νA(j) and νM(j) machines of type j for food and manufacturing produc-
tion, respectively. We assume that the subset of varieties that break (depreciate) in a
given period is the interval [(1 − δ)J,J] of capital varieties.8 The mass δJ of broken
machines is replaced by producers while production occurs.
To start production, capital variety producers need to pay up-front cost F. Capital
variety producer    uses technology
ν (  ) = AJ








   − F (8)
where AJ is a constant productivity parameter. Note that j refers to machines existing
in a given period, whereas    stands for capital varieties that are currently produced
as investment goods, becoming available for production in the next period. Like ﬁnal
sector ﬁrms, capital producers proﬁt from a wider range of available capital inputs.9
Because of ﬁxed costs, each capital variety is produced by a single ﬁrm. Since
capital varieties are imperfect substitutes, their producers have monopolistic power.
However, free market entry implies that each producer just recovers his unit cost and
makes zero proﬁts. We show in Appendix A.1 that in equilibrium each ﬁrm produces
the same, ﬁxed amount of capital varieties, given by F/ . Increasing investment leads
to an extension of the range of capital varieties, while leaving the amount ν(j) of each
5 Due to constant returns in ﬁnal production, we can assume without loss of generality that ﬁnal
sector ﬁrms are identical and have mass one. Individual ﬁrms’ output, YA and YM, and factor inputs
are then equal to aggregate output and input in the ﬁnal sector. Thus, a ﬁnal sector ﬁrm represents
aggregate ﬁnal production.
6 In the symmetric equilibrium, νM(j) =¯ νM,∀j, and thus YM = AMJη  (J¯ νM)η N
1−η
M Consequently,
for a given amount of capital J¯ νM, productivity is increasing in the number of available capital varie-
ties J, and the extent of this externality is given by η . Similarly, for agriculture production, the extent
of the externality is given by φ .
7 This assumption becomes important in our simulation. It avoids that the capital stock falls until it
ﬁnally reaches zero when consumers live at the subsistence level for a long time (Malthusian trap).
8 A simple way to motivate this assumption is to think of machines j ∈[ 0,J] as being ordered by
age, with higher-j subsets representing older machines. Due to their long use, or because of being
incompatible with new machines, the highest-j subset with mass δ breaks or becomes useless in each
period, and is immediately repaired or replaced by machines of equal quality. New machines ﬁll up
the interval from below, increasing J, but leaving the age-ordering unchanged.
9 We deliberately deviate from the standard setup to simplify our analysis below, where we derive
the model representation with two sectors and an aggregate externality.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 329
variety unchanged. This, together with symmetry in equilibrium, allows us to derive a
simpliﬁed aggregate externality representation of the model, where investment goods
are produced in the manufacturing sector.
3.3 Model representation with aggregate externalities
We show in Appendix A.4 that the production side of our model can be simpliﬁed to a
two-sector model with externalities of aggregate capital in the style of Romer (1990).
Technology is then given by










where we introduced a more convenient notation for capital: KA ≡ JνA and KM ≡
JνM, representing the capital used by a representative ﬁrm in the respective sector.
Investment, i.e., new capital varieties, are produced by the manufacturing sector, and
the price of capital, pK, is equal to the price of manufacturing output, pM.10 The
productivity-enhancing effect of an increased variety of capital inputs is obvious in
these standard Cobb–Douglas production functions. For a given J = K, the aggregate
externality is the larger the larger the capital share (φ or η) and the larger   (i.e., the
smaller the elasticity of substitution among capital varieties).
3.4 Equilibrium and industrialization
Equilibrium in our model is a sequence of factor prices, goods prices, and quantities
thatsatisﬁestheintertemporalandintra-temporaloptimizationproblemsforconsum-
ers and ﬁrms.11 To ﬁx ideas and show how industrialization happens in our model, we
ﬁrst present a simulation without consumption-dependent population dynamics. That
is, we run our model with a positive constant birth rate and without shocks, such that
all individuals survive. The next section explores how population dynamics — based
on consumption-dependent fertility decisions and positive Malthusian checks in crisis
periods — modify our results.
3.4.1 Equilibrium and industrialization without population dynamics
In this section we keep population growth constant in order to isolate the role of con-
sumption preferences (structural change) and aggregate capital externality. We show
thatevenwiththisreduced-formmodelweareabletoreplicatetwoimportantstylized
facts of the Industrial Revolution in England — the initially small, but accelerating
growth of industry output and structural change, i.e., an increasing share of industry
in GDP. We simulate the model with a constant net birth rate, equal to the average
rate in England 1700–1850, γb = 0.8%. In a non-stochastic setup, these parameters
imply that consumption never falls below subsistence such that all individuals survive.
We thus have neither a preventive (via birth rates) nor a positive (via death rates)
Malthusian check. The corresponding results are shown in Fig. 1.




 ψ(1−α)+α, where the exponent is always positive.
11 A formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium is given in Appendix A.3.330 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
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Fig. 1 Simulation results with constant population growth
Our simulation for England starts with the historical labor shares in agriculture
and manufacturing in 1700 (77% and 23%, respectively).12 Initially about half of
manufacturing output is produced to replace depreciated capital, with the other half
being used for consumption. Consumption exceeds the subsistence level so that all
individualssurviveandnetpopulationgrowthequalsthebirthrate(γN = γb).Figure1
shows that our model, even with constant birth rates, replicates the low, increasing
growth rates observed in 18th century England. Growth is driven by the exogenous
productivity progress in agriculture and by endogenous capital accumulation. Tech-
nological progress is fast enough to compensate the constant population growth of
0.8%, so that p.c. income increases.13 Per capita consumption of agriculture grows
much slower than p.c. output of manufacturing. This is explained by two mechanisms:
First, as p.c. income grows, consumption expenditure shares shift from agriculture to
manufacturing (as shown in the lower right panel). Once this transition is completed,
industry growth rates stabilize above those of agriculture, which is explained by the
second mechanism: due to their larger capital share, manufacturing ﬁrms proﬁt rela-
tively more from the aggregate externality. This is reﬂected in the upper right panel:
Initially, agricultural and manufacturing TFP grow in tandem — the larger growth
rate of p.c. industry output is thus initially solely due to its increasing demand share.
When structural change comes to a standstill, TFP and all other growth rates stabilize
12 We use the same parameter values as in the full, calibrated model. Our conclusions with regard
to structural change and the role of capital externalities are robust with respect to the choice of
parameters.
13 This would not be the case if birth rates were substantially larger, since then p.c. capital would
diminish at a rate that even the aggregate externality would not be able to compensate.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 331
at constant levels, with manufacturing TFP augmenting faster than agricultural TFP.
The investment rate is low initially because p.c. consumption is close to subsistence.
Investment then respondspositively to growing income and interest rates. Eventually,
when p.c. consumption has grown to a level well beyond subsistence and interest rates
level off, investment rates stabilize at a higher level.
3.4.2 Open economy considerations
So far, we have assumed that the UK was a closed economy, with domestic condi-
tions driving industrialization. Because of its role as a trading nation, this needs to be
justiﬁed in the British case. Before it started to manufacture cotton goods with new
technology, for example, Britain imported many of them from India.14 Eventually,
Britain exported cotton goods and the like on a grand scale. Traditional interpreta-
tions of the importance of demand have assigned an important role to exports (Cole,
1973; Gilboy, 1932). This could also affect the logic of our argument — in some open
economy models, lower initial agricultural productivity can increase the probability
of industrialization since wages (and thus, prices of exports) are lower (Matsuyama,
1991). Here, we discuss how adding foreign demand and supply would change our
basic setup.
The fact that British industrialization in cotton textiles replaced exports from India
as such does not fundamentally alter our conclusions. Rising manufacturing produc-
tivity has two consequences in the model: higher p.c. income and lower prices. Both
increase the demand for manufacturing output (the former through Engel’s Law).
In an open-economy framework, the price effect is even larger, because imports are
replaced by home production and/or due to growing international demand. The fall-
ing relative price of manufacturing would also be expected to result in growing food
imports.
An open economy setup, especially for the 18th century, must take into account
the high cost of transportation. These made it (i) easier to replace the Indian com-
petition in the UK and (ii) isolated the Indian producers from UK competition for
some of the time.15 Table 2 shows that between 1750 and 1851, the share of exports
— mainly of manufacturing products — in national output grew from about 15–20%.
As Mokyr (1977) stressed, there is no evidence that exports grew sufﬁciently rapidly
to kick-start industrialization. We conclude that our closed-economy model can serve
as a reasonable approximation.16
14 In the 1750s, Indian cotton piece exports to Britain were ﬁve times higher than British exports.
Exports from India to Britain only collapsed after 1810 (Broadberry & Gupta, 2005b, Table 6).
15 Initially, Indian exports become uncompetitive in Britain as the UK switches to industrialized
production. Home production in India remains competitive while transport costs raise the price of
UK cotton goods there. Eventually, Indian production of cotton goods for home demand falls as UK
imports become cheaper due to falling transport cost (Broadberry & Gupta, 2005b).
16 Total output, Y, approximately quadrupled between 1750 (t = 0) and 1850 (t = T) (Crafts, 1985).

















the parentheses indicate output growth due to exports and domestic demand, respectively. Let the
share of exports grow from s0
E = 15% to sT
E = 20%, as in Table 2. Then, 78% of growth is due to
domestic demand, while exports account only for 22%.332 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
Table 2 International trade in
England 1700–1851
Source: Crafts (1985), Table 6.6
and 7.1. Authors’calculation
assuming balanced trade. All
numbers in per cent
∗ Number for 1760
Year Exports / Manufactures Food Imports /
Output Exports /Output Output
1750 14.6∗ 11.0 4.5
1801 15.7 13.8 6.1
1831 14.3 13.0 3.9
1851 19.6 15.9 7.2
3.4.3 Inequality
To capture one particular feature of the pre-modern world highlighted by Fogel
(1994), we also consider the economic contribution of the bottom 20% of the income
distribution. According to Fogel, in eighteenth-century France, the poorest 20% did
not receive enough food to perform more than a few hours of work a day. We model
such an outcome by assuming that, if average consumption falls below subsistence,
membersoftheworkforcethatwilldiebecauseofmalnutritionwillalsonotbeableto
work. This is clearly too optimistic — even without starvation, many members of the
workforce will be malnourished. When harvest failures occur, the effective workforce
will shrink — except in England, which provided generous support to the poor via
outdoor relief, especially during the years of high prices in the late eighteenth century.
In the other two countries we consider — France and China — we assume that there
is no redistribution.
3.4.4 Population dynamics
Having summarized the basic properties of the economy, we now add population
dynamics. At low levels of productivity, the economy is Malthusian. As agricultural
productivity increases, population expands. As land–labor ratios fall, living standards
decline and return to their earlier level. If times are bad, starvation can cause sharp
declines in population size. We show how certain features of the demographic regime
can make the escape from the Malthusian trap possible. In particular, we demonstrate
how a low-pressure regime with limited fertility increases the chances for sustained
growth.
The size of the representative household (or population) N increases by a factor of
gb(·) at the end of each period:
N∗
t+1 = gbNt (11)
where N∗
t is the beginning-of-period population, whereas Nt stands for the popula-
tion that survived period t. The exact growth factor depends on the demographic
regime. At one extreme (“high pressure regime”), we assume a constant net birth
rate gb. Here, population returns to equilibrium after negative shocks through more
deaths(e.g.,Malthus’positivecheck).Alternatively(“lowpressureregime”),thebirth
rate depends positively on real consumption, gb(ct).17 This is because the European
marriage pattern regulated population-wide fertility by changing marriage rates. In
bad times, people married later, and fewer women ever married. Within marriage,
17 Concretely, ct denotes per-capita consumption of agriculture and manufacturing goods, that is,
ct = cA,t + cM,t.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 333
there were no signs of fertility-limitation. In this way, population is balanced by the
operation of both the positive and the preventive check.
We assume that if consumption per head falls below c, only a subset of the pop-
ulation survives. The probability of survival depends on the severity of the nutrition












With severe harvest failures, population falls, and starving individuals consume their
capital. They die when they have exhausted it.18
It could be argued that population growth should only depend on income in terms
of agricultural goods (as in Strulik, 2006). We consider our approach more intuitive,
since goods produced in urban centres were clearly an important part of the con-
sumption bundle even for poor people (King, 1997) before the Industrial Revolution,
as reﬂected by urbanization rates. However, the basic mechanism enabling sustained
growth is robust to changing the population growth function in the manner of Strulik
(2006).Sincefertilityrespondsonlytoonepartofincome,populationgrowthisslower.
The positive externality has a smaller effect. Hence, TFP and output growth also slow
down. However, industrializations still occur with a high frequency.19







= gbgs(ct) − 1 (13)
where gb depends on ct or is a positive constant.
Thebirth functiongb(·) is crucialfortheescapefromtheMalthusiantrap.20 Ifbirth
ratesatlowlevelsofconsumptionarealsolow,andtheresponseofbirthstoimproving
conditionsissmall,productivitygrowthcantranslateintogrowthofper-capitaincome
(despite the fact that population grows). This will be the case if gb(·) is relatively ﬂat
at c.
Where gb(·) is a positive constant, escaping the Malthusian trap is nearly impos-
sible. If the constant birth rate gb exceeds productivity growth, resources are not
sufﬁcient to nurture everyone and the surviving population remains trapped at the
subsistencelevel.21 Wewillfromnowonusethefullmodel,withpopulationdynamics.
Next, we describe the economic effects of demographic interactions, contrasting the
“low pressure” and the “high pressure” regimes. In this setup, we show how fertility
limitation helps the escape from the Malthusian trap.
Figure 2 shows population growth as a function of capital per head (k)—i nt h el e f t
panel for the low-pressure regime and in the right panel for the high-pressure regime.
Capital stock per head corresponds to a certain level of per capita income, given a
certain level of TFP. As incomes and consumption improve, birth rates γb increase in
the low-pressure regime, while they are constant in the high-pressure regime. Above
18 Diamond (2004) describes how the Norse colony in Greenland collapsed after years of worsening
climatic conditions, until farmers started to eat their calves and seed corn.
19 Thegrowthrateofoutputpercapitaover150periodswiththeStrulikassumptionsis0.34%instead
of 0.56% in the deterministic baseline simulation.
20 See Appendix A.7 for our calibration of the birth function for England.
21 In our calibrated model for China in 1700, for example, the constant birth rate is 4%, while deaths
occur with rate 3.2%, implying a net population growth of 0.8% p.a.334 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361


































Fig. 2 Population dynamics for England and China
point A, income rises with k such that death rates (given by γb − γN) dwindle to
zero. The solid black line shows the gross rate of capital formation, inv/k, where real
investment is inv = (y − e)/pK.22 The growth rate of capital stock per capita is given
by the difference between inv/k and effective depreciation (δ + γN). In equilibrium
with constant k, the capital-diluting effects of population growth and depreciation
offset each other: (δ + γN)k = (y − e)/pK.
We begin by analyzing the low-pressure regime. To the left of point A, consump-
tion is below subsistence (c < c), and due to the crisis no new individuals are born
(γb = 0). Investment just replaces depreciation.23 Net population growth γN is neg-
ative such that the increasing land-labor ratio implied by falling population ﬁnally
drives the economy back to an equilibrium at point A. At point A, consumption is
at subsistence (c = c); the birth rate is zero. Point A is an unstable equilibrium. For
higher levels of k, incomes improve and investment rises. Eventually, declining mar-
ginal returns to capital force down the inv/k curve. The new (stable) equilibrium is
point B, which combines constant k and a growing population.
In the high pressure regime, the economy behaves differently. The right panel of
ﬁgure 2 depicts the interactions of demographic growth, investment, and output. For
low levels of capital, there is also starvation, as in England. Point A now is a stable
equilibrium with c < c, and birth rates that are offset by death rates. However, with
capital slightly higher than at point A, death rates fall quickly until the economy
reaches point B, where c = c.24 Now, death rates are zero, and demographic growth
becomes very fast. Consumers respond to this rapid population growth by investing
massively, in order to ensure minimal consumption tomorrow, when they expect to
share their income with many others. This explains the steep slope of the inv/k curve
to the right of point B. However, despite saving all income above subsistence, demo-
graphic growth is too rapid — capital–labor ratios fall, driving the economy back to
point A. If the economy reaches point C, capital–labor ratios stabilize, as the capi-
tal stock expands at the same rate as population. However, point C is not a stable
22 This is gross of depreciation.
23 Thisfollowsfromourassumptionthatproducersimmediatelyreplacedepreciatedcapitalvarieties.
Without this assumption consumers would choose not to repair the capital stock and even consume
out of it if consumption falls below subsistence.
24 Between A and B, net investment is zero because consumption is below subsistence.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 335
equilibrium since a small negative shock will drive the economy back to point A. To
the right of C, investment falls rapidly, as marginal returns decline and saving rates
reduce.
Only the low pressure regime is likely to generate endogenous TFP growth. At
point B in the low-pressure regime, total capital is growing with population. Because
of the aggregate externality, this generates TFP growth. In Fig. 2 this would be equiv-
a l e n tt oas h i f tu pa n dt ot h el e f to ft h einv/k line — for any given capital stock,
incomes are now higher. There is also an outward shift of the birth schedule, since
higher incomes stimulate higher birth rates and sustain a larger population at the
same p.c. capital level. The combined effect under our calibration leads to a point
B  that is markedly higher, and further to the right — TFP growth produces a new
equilibrium B  that is more capital intensive, has higher incomes, and more rapid
population growth. This explains the gradual acceleration of growth rates in the low
pressure regime.
In the high pressure regime, endogenous growth is not impossible but highly un-
likely. Higher TFP simply shifts the investment schedule to the left — for any given
level of capital, potential consumption is higher, but so is population growth. Higher
productivity leads to a bigger population, with unchanged income at A. If the (con-
stant) birth rate under the high-pressure regime was low enough, growth could occur,
because the investment schedule would eventually cross the line given by δ + γN.
This would create a stable equilibrium point C, similar to point B in the low-pressure
regime. The maximum rate of population increase that does not exhaust investment
possibilities varies with starting conditions. In our calibration, a country with an initial
non-agricultural labor share of 23% (equivalent to Britain’s in 1700) could have sus-
tained populationgrowth rates of upto 3.7%becauseof highinitial income;a country
with only 10% in non-agricultural occupations (as China in 1700) could not have
coped with rates higher than 0.6% without foregoing its chances to industrialize.25
4 Calibration and simulation results
Inthissectionweexplainthecalibrationofourmodel,andsimulateitwithandwithout
shocks to agricultural productivity. We then derive the probability of industrialization
in England, France, and China. In addition, we illustrate what would have happened
to the English economy had it operated under a high-pressure demographic regime
instead. Finally, we simulate the model without the kind of redistribution that the
Poor Law provided.
4.1 Calibration
We normalize initial population of England to unity (N0 = 1) and choose land L = 8
suchthatitsrentalrateis5%.WechooseinitialagriculturalTFPandaggregatecapital
to match the historical labor share in agriculture of 77% in 1700.26 Aggregate capital
K inﬂuences TFP via the externality. In order to identify the initial conditions for
AA,0 and K0, we re-normalize the production functions, dividing by K
φ 
0 in agriculture
25 These are the results for non-stochastic simulations. In calibrations with shocks, there would be a
distribution of industrialization outcomes for each demographic growth rate. See Section 4.4.
26 We derive this ﬁgure from Craft’s (1985) original numbers by leaving out other sectors than
agriculture and manufacturing and re-normalizing the sum of these two sectors’ labor shares to unity.336 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
Fig. 3 Real wage ﬂuctuation and trend. Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
and by K
η 
0 in manufacturing. This means that the aggregate externality term has
value one in the initial period.27 We choose AM such that the price of manufacturing
products is double the price of agriculture products, i.e., pM = 2.28 This procedure
gives AA,0 = 0.517 and AM = 0.359. Given these parameters, we derive a low level
of capital, Kmin, at which consumption is at the subsistence level (c = c).B e l o wt h i s
level, only agricultural goods are consumed, and aggregate capital does not inﬂuence
TFP. The externality works only if K ≥ Kmin.29 In other words, it is not before the
“wave of gadgets” (Ashton, 1964) arrives that the aggregate externality begins to
matter quantitatively.
In the centuries before 1700, labor productivity grew at an average rate of 0.15%
per year (Galor, 2005). Because agriculture was the dominant sector, we assume an
exogenous growth rate of TFP growth in the sector of γA = 0.15%.
The magnitude and persistence of shocks in the agricultural sector is derived from
real wage data for England, 1600–1780 (Wrigley et al., 1997). With ﬁxed labor supply
and agriculture the dominant sector, these productivity shocks have an immediate
knock-on effect on real wages in the economy. This is especially true since wages were
largely ﬁxed in nominal terms, and most of the variation in the Phelps–Brown/Hop-
kins wage series results from changes in agricultural prices (Wrigley et al., 1997). We
therefore use the wage zt as an indicator of the size of shocks. Figure 3 shows the real
wage index and the corresponding Hodrick–Prescott-trend.30
27 This normalization does not change any of the features of our model. In fact, dividing K by K0
is equivalent to re-deﬁning A in the production function. For example, let the original production





M . Then choose AM such that A∗
M = AM/K
η 
0 . This gives the new





28 Different values of this parameter change our results only slightly. They do so at all because
pM = pK, and a different price of capital implies a different real capital stock.









}]η  in manufacturing.
30 Thestandarddeviationofrealwagesisverysimilartothestandarddeviationofagriculturaloutput
in later years.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 337
The magnitude of shocks is derived from analyzing the autocorrelation of wages.
We estimate lnzt = θ lnzt−1 + εt, which produces θ = 0.60 (t=10.15) and σε = 0.075.
The autocorrelation of shocks is high, and the series is volatile.
For the baseline model, we calibrate the parameters (µ, φ, η,  )to ﬁt average factor
shares for the period 1700–1850. In agriculture, we use µ = 0.4 for labor, φ = 0.25
for capital, and the remaining 0.35 for land. This is similar to the 40–20–40 split
suggested by Crafts (1985), and is almost identical with the average in Stokey’s (2001)
two calibrations. In manufacturing, we use a capital share of η = 0.35.31
We normalize the minimum food consumption c to unity. For low income levels,
Eq. (2) implies that all expenditure goes to agriculture. With higher incomes, the
expenditure share converges to α. We take expenditure data from Crafts (1985),
using the same re-normalization as for labor shares. The agriculture consumption
share falls from 65% in the 18th to 30% at the end of the 19th century. We thus use
α = 0.3. Next, we need to choose ψ, i.e., the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. In the literature, values between 1 and 4 have been used. We employ
ψ = 1, which implies log-utility, because this matches the elastic supply of savings
during the Industrial Revolution.32 In order to capture the low initial share of invest-
ment (4% in 1700, 6% in 1760, taken from Crafts 1985, Table 4.1), we need a low
discount factor, and use β = 0.93 and depreciation rate δ = 0.02.
The aggregate externality plays a central role in our model. The extent of the
externality is given by φ  in agriculture and by η  in manufacturing production. In
manufacturing, total factor productivity is given by AM(K/K0)η , where the ﬁrst term
and K0 are constant. Growth of manufacturing TFP is
γT,M = η  γK (14)
Total factor productivity in agriculture is determined by AA(K/K0)φ , where the ﬁrst
term grows at the exogenous rate γA:
γT,A = γA + φ  γK (15)
Crafts (1985) provides growth accounting ﬁgures for England, 1700–1860. We present
the corresponding TFP and aggregate capital growth rates in Fig. 3. If the aggregate
externality link from capital to TFP in our model represents historical facts, we would
expect a linear relationship between the growth rates of the two variables. Figure 4
lends some support to this supposition.33
Average annual growth rates are γ K = 1.17% and γ T = 0.48% for capital and TFP,
respectively.Thereisnoagreementintheliteratureastowhetherproductivitygrowth
in agriculture was faster, slower or equal to productivity growth in modern sectors.
For example, Crafts (1985: 70–89) concluded that productivity growth in agriculture
was rapid, and in some periods surpassed manufacturing productivity growth. On the
31 Stokey (2001) uses a calibration for an energy-capital aggregate with the average share of 0.4.
32 The higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution implied by the smaller ψ meansthat consumers’
savings react more elastically to changes in the interest rate. On the high elasticity of savings, see
Allen (2005b).
33 Ofcourse,wedonotclaimherethatourmodelistheonlyexplanationoftherelationshipobserved
in the growth accounting data. In fact, the causality could also go the other way around — from exog-
enous TFP growth to capital accumulation. However, what matters for our calibration is the linearity
of the relationship, while we suppose the direction of causality to be from K to TFP, along the main








0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5























Fig. 4 Annual growth rates of TFP and aggregate capital. Source: Derived from Crafts (1985) and
Crafts & Harley (1992)
other hand, Clark (2003b) argued that they took a long time to materialize. We there-
fore assume that the growth of labor productivity was broadly speaking the same in
manufacturing and agriculture. Thus, aggregate TFP growth is equal to sectoral TFP
growth, and we can estimate the relationship (14) using the data represented in Fig. 3.
A weighted least-square estimation (with the length of periods serving as weights)
withoutconstantyieldstheestimate   η  = 0.44(t = 7.26).34 With η = 0.35,thisimplies
  = 1.25, corresponding to an elasticity of substitution across capital varieties of 1.8.
There is an easy way to check the consistency of this calibration with other calibrated
variables: we use the observed γ K and γ T together with the calibrated γA, φ,a n d
  to check (15). The result is 0.51% on the right-hand side, which corresponds well
to γ T = 0.48%.35 For the observed growth of aggregate capital 1700–1860, our cali-
bration thus implies very similar TFP growth rates in manufacturing and agriculture,
where the latter also includes an exogenous term.
We employ a birth schedule gb(c) based on the historically observed co-movement
with wages (cf. Figure 8).36 It is derived from ﬁtting the empirical data with a spline
regression, as described in detail in Appendix A.7. For the demographic regime with
positive Malthusian check, gb is a constant equal to the net birth rate.
We summarize the calibration parameters in Table 3.
4.2 The industrial revolution in England
How well does the calibrated version of our model ﬁt the historical data for Eng-
land? We start in 1700 and run the simulation for 150years. Figure 5 compares the
34 Another possibility is to take average values instead of running a regression. The result is very
similar: γK/γT = 0.41.
35 Our choice of the capital shares φ and η is crucial for this result.
36 We use the data from Wrigley et al. (1997).J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 339
Table 3 Baseline calibration Symbol Interpretation Value
Parameters
α Agriculture expenditure share 0.3
β Consumer discount rate 0.93
ψ CRRA utility parameter 1
φ Capital share in agriculture 0.25
µ Labor share in agriculture 0.4
η Capital share in manufacturing 0.35
  Parameter for capital variety substitutability 1.25
c Subsistence food consumption 1
L Land 8
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.02
γA Growth of agriculture technology 0.0015
θ Autocorrelation of shocks to agriculture 0.6
σε Standard Deviation of shocks to agriculture 0.075
AM Manufacturing technology parameter 0.359
Initial Conditions
N0 Initial population 1
AA,0 Initial agriculture technology parameter 0.517
K0 Initial aggregate capital 1.718
Kmin Capital at which c = c 1.308
non-stochastic simulation and historical facts. Over the period as a whole, population
triples, while real per capita income doubles — mainly due to the increase of man-
ufacturing output. Importantly, growth rates of output and TFP are initially low but
increase over time. The model does well in capturing one of the key characteristics
highlighted by economic historians in recent years — the slow rate of productivity
and output growth (Crafts and Harley, 1992). Also, output of agricultural products
increases only slightly in our model, in line with the historical record (Allen, 1992),
Table 8.7].
The behavior of population and real manufacturing output is captured well by the
model,evenifweoverestimatethegrowthofthelattersomewhat.Initially,investment
mainlyreplacesdepreciatedcapital.Evenwithalowdepreciationrateofδ = 0.02,this
implies an investment share of about 6%, which exceeds the historical estimate for
1700.37 Our simulation replicates the rise of the investment rate during the following
decades, but falls short of its full extent. One possible reason is changes in δ.D e p r e -
ciation rates may have increased over time because machines became increasingly
complex and technological obsolesence rendered useable equipment unproﬁtable.
Real investment per capita grows by a factor of 3.5, which is accounted for by an
increasing investment rate, growing income, and a falling relative price of capital
(dropping by 25%). Population growth peaks around 1820, which coincides with the
historical facts. TFP in agriculture and manufacturing is growing at similar rates.
Agriculture beneﬁts from exogenous growth (γA = 0.15%); manufacturing from the
greater externality resulting from its higher capital share. Payments to land become
less important in total output, while capital and labor gain about 5% each. Stokey
(2001) shows that labor and capital gained a larger share of the pie, and that land lost
about 10% points of aggregate income — yet the gains for capital in our model are
somewhat smaller than the historical record suggests.
37 The corresponding equations are I = δpKK and pKRKK = τY, where τ is the aggregate capital
share. For τ   0.3 and RK   0.1 (the approximate values in 1700) this yields I/Y = δτ / RK   0.06.340 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
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Fig. 5 Simulation and data for England 1700–1850. Sources: Allen (1992), Crafts (1985), Wrigley and
Schoﬁeld (1981)
Employment shares in agriculture and manufacturing ﬁt the data well, while the
model overestimates the income share of agriculture.38 One reason for this is hidden
unemployment in agriculture — many workers in the English ﬁelds in 1700 may have
added little to output. With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution around 1780,
many of these laborers migrated to the cities. For these later years, the ﬁt with our
model is markedly better. Finally, TFP growth in our simulation ﬁts the actual data
well.39
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In the following we provide robustness checks of our model. We start from the base-
line calibration and sequentially change key parameters (similar to Lagerlöf, 2006).
The results are summarized in Table 4. Our baseline used an exogenous rate of
38 We derive the historical employment and income shares based on the numbers in Crafts (1985:
62). We exclude the service sector, renormalize the percentages and interpolate to ﬁnd the data for
1700–1860.
39 The exception is the unusually low TFP in the late eighteenth century, when negative shocks such
as the Napoleonic Wars may have made a big difference (Temin & Voth, 2005; Williamson, 1984).J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 341
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis
Changed parameters y1850/y1700 k1850/k1700 N1850/N1700 NM,1850/N1850
none [Baseline Model] 2.31 2.28 2.93 0.57
γA = 0,   = 1.5 1.99 1.98 2.40 0.50
φ = 0.2, η = 0.5,   = 0.88 2.61 3.11 3.18 0.45
ψ = 4 2.40 2.33 3.17 0.57
agricultural TFP growth, γA = 0.15% p.a. In the ﬁrst sensitivity check, we set this
to zero. In order to ﬁt the observed relationship between capital and TFP growth
(Fig. 4), we consequently re-calibrate  , obtaining a higher value.40 Thus, some of the
growth that was previously exogenous is now the result of a stronger aggregate exter-
nality.Withallotherparametersidenticalwiththebaselinecalibration,thesimulation
yields slower growth, capital accumulation, and structural change when γA = 0. The
difference with our baseline is however relatively minor.
In the second alternative speciﬁcation, we change the capital shares in agriculture
(φ = 0.2) and manufacturing (η = 0.5). This represents the φ suggested by Crafts
(1985) and the η used by Stokey (2001).41 The larger aggregate capital share now
implies a smaller  .42 Since capital is more important in aggregate production, it
generates more externalities;   thus has to be smaller to maintain the observed rela-
tionship between capital and TFP growth.43 The simulation results shown in the third
row of Table 4 reveal that the larger manufacturing capital share leads to accelerated
growth of output, population, and capital stock, compared to the baseline. Again,
the difference is not very large. Because of its greater capital share, the manufac-
turing sector now proﬁts more from aggregate capital accumulation, and TFP rises
relative to agriculture. The relative price of pM thus falls. Since pM = pK, the price
of investment also falls. Consequently, a given investment ratio leads to more capital
deepening. Faster capital accumulation, on the other hand, implies more rapid TFP
growth, creating a virtuous circle.
Our ﬁnal sensitivity check examines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
1/ψ. The usual range for the CRRA parameter ψ is between 1 and 4. While we used
ψ = 1 in the baseline, we now choose ψ = 4. The last row of Table 4 shows that
growth and structural change occur somewhat faster than in the baseline simulation.
This might be considered counterintuitive. In one-sector growth models, the growth
rate typically depends negatively on ψ. In a two-sector model, the relative price of
manufacturing output can change. The baseline simulation has pM rising initially, and
40 In the baseline calibration, Eqs. (14) and (15) give γT,M   γT,A   0.51% p.a. Thus, total TFP
growthγT   0.51inthebaselinecase.Wenowusethisﬁguretoderive  forthecaseγA = 0.Giventhat
the average share of agriculture in GDP was about 60% between 1700 and 1850 [abstracting from the
service sector, which we do not model], the corresponding approximation γT   0.6γT,A +0.4γT,M =
0.6φ  γK + 0.4η  γK implies     1.5. Note that we cannot obtain γT,M = γT,A if γA = 0a n dφ  = η.
41 To ensure comparability, we use her ﬁgure for the “capital-energy aggregate in the manufacturing
sector.”
42 Since γA > 0, we use the same procedure as in the baseline calibration. We obtain   = 0.88
from   η  = 0.44 and η = 0.5. Note that for γK = 1.17% we now have γT,M >γ T,A, which deviates
somewhat from the historical record.
43 We also need to re-calibrate initial TFP in agriculture and manufacturing as well as the initial
capital stock. These are AA,0 = 0.505, AM = 0.325, and K0 = 1.79, respectively.342 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
then falling steadily.44 In the baseline simulation with log-utility, the change in pM has
no impact since the income and substitution effect cancel each other. With ψ>1,
however, the income effect is relatively stronger. An (expected) increase in the price
ofconsumptionlowerstoday’sexpenditureandyieldsanincreaseininvestment.Con-
sequently, with ψ = 4 the investment rates at the beginning are larger than in the
baseline simulation, which explains the faster growth.45
4.4 The role of chance
Adding shocks to our model produces a signiﬁcant dispersion of industrialization
outcomes. It also slows development on average. In the stochastic simulations, a nega-
tive shock lowers both total income and investment. Moreover, large negative shocks
lead to starvation and a net decline of population and capital stock, reducing the
scope for the capital externality to work its wonders. There is also a second, more
subtle effect: In the stochastic simulation, a positive shock to agricultural productivity
causesasurgeinexpenditure,andmoredemandformanufacturinggoods.Investment
increases. However, the positive shock to agricultural productivity also makes food
much cheaper. This produces an increase in the relative price of capital so that a given
quantity of savings translates into relatively less capital accumulation. By contrast, in
the deterministic simulation, the relative price of capital (produced in manufactur-
ing) does not change quickly, because agricultural and manufacturing TFP grow in
tandem.
Figure6showstheresultsof1,000modelruns,startingwiththeparametersfor1700,
and simulating the model over 150 periods.46 The share of the workforce in manufac-
turing is our indicator of industrialization. It varies substantially across simulations,
and so does the growth rate.
The results lend support to Crafts’s (1977) argument that historical accident may
have contributed to England industrializing ﬁrst — the range of outcomes is wide.
Also, the actual historical performance of the English economy is in the better half
of possible results. Most likely, England would have had markedly lower per capita
income and experienced an even slower shift out of agriculture — many simulation
values for 1850 are as much as one third lower. A run of good years in the 1740s aided
the transformation, by producing higher incomes. This then led to higher demand
for manufactured products (Gilboy, 1932). To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst calibra-
tion exercise that demonstrates, based on a fully speciﬁed model, the extent to which
Britain’s industrial dominance in 1850 was the result of a lucky draw. Analogously,
it could be argued that other, unmodelled factors — such as the Glorious Revolu-
tion’s strengthening of property rights emphasized by North and Thomas (1973) —
facilitated the acceleration of actual growth compared to the predicted rate. If chance
played a role in the absolute rate of progress after 1700, it is natural to ask if it also
played a role in determining which country got to be the First Industrial Nation. This
is what we examine next.
44 The explanation is provided by Eqs. (14 ) and (15). Initially, capital accumulation proceeds slowly,
such that γK is small and γT,M <γ T,A. Thus, the relative price of manufacturing increases. In later
periods, when γK is larger, the opposite is true.
45 Although investment rates are lower in later periods, the virtuous capital-externality-circle initi-
ated in the early periods prevails.
46 The model is solved numerically as described in Appendix A.6. For the stochastic simulations, we
allow agricultural TFP AA to follow the random process described in Section 3.2.1.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 343
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Fig. 6 Stochastic simulation for England 1700–1850
4.5 Probabilities of industrialization in other countries
Why did England industrialize ﬁrst? Could it have been France or China instead? In
our model, industrialization occurs stochastically, but initial income, inequality, and
the demographic regime are crucial determinants. Starting positions differed a good
deal. We summarize some key variables in Table 5. England was both richer and more
urbanized than France and China in 1700.
Table 5 Income, urbanization and population growth in other countries
Year p.c. income∗ Population Urban Shares NM/N∗∗
(in 1990 Geary- growth (%) (%)
Khamis dollars) (% p.a.)
1700 1820 1700-1820 1820-1850 1700 1800 1700
England 1250 1706 0.76∗∗∗ 0.83 13.3 20.3 23
France 910 1135 0.31 0.51 9.2 8.8 16
China 600 600 0.85 0.26 6.0 3.8 10
Sources: Maddison (2003) for p.c. income and population growth; de Vries (1984) for urban shares in
England and France; Broadberry and Gupta (2005a) for urban shares in China
∗ Maddison ﬁgures are controversial. In the calibration we rely on urban share
∗∗ Manufacturing Labor Share. For England: Calculated from Crafts (1985), leaving out services. For
France and China: Author’s calculation based on urban shares, assuming that the British ratio of the
urban share to total employment in manufacturing is indicative of ratios elsewhere
∗∗∗ 1701-1751: 0.25%, from Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)344 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361







England 23% 0.29% 0.28% 1.101
France 16% 0.32% 0.32% 1.045
China 11% 4.0% 0.73% 0.969
In order to compare England’s chances of industrialization in 1700 with those of
other countries, we need detailed, reliable data on per capita incomes, birth rates, and
income support. There has recently been an upsurge of historical research on Chinese
wages and the productivity of its agricultural sector. Revisionists’ arguments along
the lines of Pomeranz (2000) have proven to be overoptimistic about living standards
in China. Land productivity was impressive, especially in the Yangtze delta. In some
parts, where political pressures limited rent increases, peasants could live quite well,
especially when measured in terms of the price of agricultural goods. Where silver
wages are used — more relevant for our comparisons of the ability to purchase goods
other than food — the gap between Europe and China is wide (Broadberry and
Gupta, 2005a). Without politically skewed incomes, however, conditions were much
less favorable. Laborers were paid poorly. Everywhere after 1620, as a result of popu-
lation pressure, “the downward trend toward immiseration is stark” (Allen, 2006).47
In the most comprehensive study of comparative living standards yet, Allen Bassino,
Ma,Mall-Murata,andvanZanden(2005)foundthatChinesefamilies’incomeslagged
behindNorthernEuropeanonesbyalargemargin.OnlyintheimpoverishedSouthof
Europe — like Milan — were living standard comparable. Allen et al. (2005) suggest
thattheratioofEnglishtoChinesewagesmayhavebeencloseto2:1.Broadberryand
Gupta (2005a) derive even more pessimistic ﬁgures for silver wages in the Yangtze.
In order to stack the odds in favor of China’s prospects, we consistently make
the most optimistic assumptions possible. To capture the much more prosperous
conditions in the most advanced areas (Allen et al., 2005), like the Yangtze delta,
we do not rely on the Maddison income ﬁgures. Instead, we calibrate with the urban
shares from Broadberry and Gupta (2005a), which imply a relatively smaller gap in
incomes. Table 6 gives our calibration ﬁgures. We calibrate TFP in agriculture and
manufacturing such that we match both net population growth and manufacturing
labor shares as close as possible.48 Given the calibrated TFP, we can compute the
implied consumption level relative to subsistence, c/c. As Allen et al. (2005) argue,
there is indeed a substantial part of the population in China that is not able to satisfy
basic subsistence needs, as reﬂected by c/c < 1. As given in Eq. (12), this corresponds
tostarvationofpartofthepopulationsuchthatγN <γ b.InFrance,ontheotherhand,
c > c such that everyone survives and γN = γb. Note that since we avoided the pitfalls
of size effects, TFP growth in our model is not dependent on size of the economy
as such, but is driven by capital accumulation. More capital in agriculture yields the
same beneﬁts as in manufacturing. This biases our results towards industrialization in
China, since there almost all capital is used in agriculture in 1700.
47 Allen (2005a) does not provide ﬁgures for 1700, offering estimates for 1620 instead. His ﬁnding of
a strong trend towards immiseration, and of broady comparable starting levels in incomes sustained
by politically biased distribution of rents, is consistent with our argument here.
48 Deviations from historical population growth and manufacturing labor shares as given in Table 5
are small. As in the English case, manufacturing TFP is chosen such that pM = 2.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 345
The birth rates for both France and China are constant. In the case of France, this
is a simpliﬁcation — population growth was low, and birth rates declined after 1800
in parallel with death rates. Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) show that France had more
of a “high pressure” demographic regime, with birth rates responding too little to
avoid additional adjustment through the positive check. We deliberately simplify to
highlight the importance of the demographic regime, and assume a constant birth rate
to match observed population growth rates. For China, we also use historical data on
population growth. We observe maximum fertility rates in the period immediately
before the demographic transition in China (Chesnais, 1992), which implies net birth
rates of 4% in our setup (with inﬁnitely-lived agents). Analogous to the British case,
French shocks are derived from the movement of grain wages (Labrousse, Romano,
& Dreyfus, 1970).49 For China, we used both the French and the British shock param-
eters in the stochastic simulation, but the results do not differ. According to our
assumptions in section 3.4.3, there is also no redistribution to support lower incomes
during times of crisis in France and China.50
Figure 7 shows the results of our stochastic simulations. For China, our simulations
on average predict a decline in per capita income, combined with a very low labor
share in manufacturing.51 There are some cases of industrial development, but they
are rare and stop far short of the extent of industrialization witnessed in England.
The periods of benign development result from a sequence of positive shocks, which
leads to capital accumulation outpacing demographic growth. As aggregate capital
grows, the externality pushes up TFP. Eventually, the investment schedule crosses
the line deﬁned by δ + γN twice: from below for lower k and from above for higher
k (due to decreasing returns to capital the investment schedule eventually becomes
downward-sloping). The latter is a stable equilibrium with growing population and
p.c. income (Right panel of Fig. 2).
France has markedly higher probabilities of industrializing than China. Its average
share of the labor force in manufacturing in our simulations is 36.5% — much less
than Britain, but a long way away from pre-industrial stagnation. Growth is markedly
slower, at less than half the British rate. The two distributions overlap to some extent.
As Crafts (1977) argued, much of the difference between the experience of France
versus England could be due to chance. Detailed examinations of “France’s failure”
may have suffered from hindsight bias, ﬁnding causes where there was simply bad
luck. In comparison with China, on the other hand, chance plays almost no role — the
British performance in all of our simulations is markedly better than the best possible
one for China.
4.6 Turning England into China
What was crucial about England’s starting conditions — its demographic regime, its
favorable income level, or the redistributive institutions that raised incomes for the
bottom 40% of the population?
First, we simulate the development of the British economy using the same param-
eters as in the baseline calibration before, but changing the birth rate to a constant
4%.Inthemajorityofsimulations,afterintroducingtheChinesedemographicregime
49 We use ﬁgures for 1726-1792 and ﬁnd θ = 0.595(t = 5.71) and σε = 0.13.
50 As in the case of England, the effect of redistribution is negligible.
51 This is in line with the tendency towards involution found by Allen (2005a).346 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361


























































































Fig. 7 Stochastic simulation for 1700–1850
in England, individual consumption declines to subsistence, so that all consumption
expenditure goes to agriculture. The economy typically starts near point C (Fig. 2).
Population grows very quickly because higher initial incomes reduce death rates.
Despitehighsavingsrates,capitalperheaddeclines.Thispushestheeconomytowards
A. Instead of growing by 0.34% on average per year, per capita incomes now fall by
0.15% annually. As a result of high birth rates, N can grow quite quickly in a short
period of time. Eventually, the economy reaches a stable equilibrium at point A,
where during periods with average productivity, the only demand for manufactured
goods comes from investment. Over the period as a whole, demographic growth will
be slower than in the baseline case due to high mortality, driven by falling living stan-
dards.Ourresultsthereforesuggestthat,insteadofbeingabletoindustrialize,England
wouldhaveseenaneconomiccollapsewithahigh-pressuredemographicregime.This
underlines the crucial importance of fertility limitation as part of Europe’s unique
demographic regime. In passing, we might want to note that the parts of Europe
where the European Marriage Pattern was weakest (Southern and Eastern Europe
(Hajnal,1965)alsosufferedfromlongdelaysbeforeindustrialdevelopmentgotunder
way.52
What is the importance of starting conditions? Is a high starting point crucial for
England’s high chance to industrialize? We can repeat the simulations with Chinese
startingconditions,butanEnglishdemographicregime.InFig.2(leftpanel),theinv/k
curve is shifted down and to the right. The economy at B will now grow more slowly
52 Japan is also a case in point for our model — as noted by Mosk (1976), it had strikingly low fertility
during the Tokugawa period. Infanticide, not fertility limitation through changes in nuptiality, may
have been decisive.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 347
Table 7 Counterfactual
simulations for Britain —
results for 1850
Note: All results are the
median of 1000 stochastic
simulations, each over 150
periods
p.c. Income Population Labor
growth growth share in M
Baseline Model 0.34% 0.57% 49.1%
Chinese Demography -0.15% 0.12% 4.6%
Chinese Starting
Levels 0.13% -0.08% 28.2%
No Subsidies
to the Poor 0.33% 0.56% 48.4%
as aggregate capital accumulation slows to a crawl. As Table 7 shows, with Chinese
starting levels and the English demographic regime, the country would have seen
slow growth of per capita incomes. The share of the population in manufacturing rises
gradually, eventually surpassing England’s level in 1700. Population may stagnate or
even fall because initially, many households are near the subsistence minimum.53
Forourﬁnalcounterfactual,weexaminetheeffectsofredistribution.Inourmodel,
the Poor Law is potentially important because it ensures that the malnourished can
work even during years with poor harvests. We model this by assuming that in the
absence of redistribution, during crisis periods (c < c) the part of the population that
will starve also does not work (reﬂecting the basic insight from Fogel, 1994). Adding
this effect to our simulations ampliﬁes the impact of negative shocks in the short
run. Over the long run, it hardly matters at all because higher land-labor ratios have
a stabilizing inﬂuence. In China, the absence of redistribution makes catastrophic
declines of population and output more likely. As noted by Lagerlöf (2006), these
are a constant feature of the pre-industrial world. As it happens, British per capita
incomes are too high even in 1700 for this mechanism to make much of a difference.
Very good outcomes — showing growth above 0.6% p.a. — are more common in the
simulations with redistribution, but the average is basically the same for stochastic
simulations with and without the Poor Law.
5 Conclusions
This paper offers quantitative answers to our two initial questions: “Why England?”
and“whyEurope?”Basedonacalibratedtwo-sectorgrowthmodelwithanaggregate
capital externality, we argue that Europe’s unique demographic regime ensured start-
ing positions that made industrial development much more likely. No lucky accident
through a few good harvests, or as a result of natural resource endowments, could
have similarly raised the chances to industrialize. Nor could redistribution, on its own,
have had sufﬁciently benign effects.
We derive a model that focuses on the ﬁrst transition in uniﬁed growth theory
— from Malthusian stagnation to a post-Malthusian regime (Galor & Weil, 2000;
Galor, 2005). The key driving variable is not the generation of ideas through a link
with population size or an increase in the population’s quality. Factors highlighted
by historians of technology play a crucial role — such as the importance of chance
in new inventions, the role of tinkering, and essentially non-economic motives for
53 Because of low fertility in the English demographic regime, recovery from negative shocks takes
a long time.348 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
innovation (Mokyr, 1990). All of this suggests that the biggest single determinant of
technological progress was not the patent system, nor population size, but the fertility
regime and the use of differentiated capital inputs. Interacting with the installed stock
of machinery created the opportunities for “microinventions,” in Mokyr’s phrase.
England’s chances to make many microinventions were good mainly because of
high per capita incomes, resulting from fertility restriction. A more effective work
force because of redistributive institutions raised output and increased industrializa-
tion probabilities, but this channel’s role was small. These conclusions follow from
our simulations of England’s Industrial Revolution, which show a close ﬁt between
historical fact and model output. We also show how important it was that popula-
tion growth accelerated in a context of high per capita incomes. Economic historians
have long puzzled over the fact that the country with the biggest population increase
between 1550 and 1800 also saw the biggest increase in per capita output (Wrigley,
1988). In our model, this is no accident, but arises naturally from the interaction of
starting conditions, the demographic regime, and the capital-use externality.
Based on the simulation for England, we vary the parameter values to examine
France’sandChina’schancetodevelop.TheexercisesuggeststhatFrancehadreason-
ableprospectstodevelop,too.TheabsenceofthePoorLawandamorehigh-pressure
demographic regime reduced its chances, but not to such an extent that history could
not have played itself out differently. The answer for China is fundamentally differ-
ent. Because of the capital-diluting effects of rapid population growth, its chances of
industrializing were very small. Only very unlikely sequences of good shocks could
have given it a chance to develop.
Our results also highlight one mechanism through which inequality in the early
stages of development may be growth-reducing — if nutrient availability overall is
low, redistribution from top to bottom may create opportunities for growth because
it raises the workforce’s effectiveness. This could qualify the conclusions by Galor
and Moav (2004). They argued that greater inequality is beneﬁcial when physical
capital accumulation is key. The Galor and Moav effect may be conditional on overall
nutrient supply being sufﬁciently generous to leave all groups of society in a position
to perform hard labor. In our simulations, however, the consequences of workforce
effectiveness matter, but are never large enough in the long run to dominate our
results.
Economic historians have sometimes been sceptical that endogenous growth mod-
els can capture the complexity of the historical industrialization experience. Standard
modelling approaches grappled with cross-sectional differences in timing and speed.
Crafts (1995) concluded that the contrasting experiences of France and England did
not seem to ﬁt the mould of early models. Because of this, he argued interpreta-
tions based on exogenous growth should be preferred. Our results demonstrate that
more recent advances in uniﬁed growth theory can do much to resolve seeming
contradictions between the historical record and growth models. In particular, the
emphasis on capital accumulation and declining constraints on population growth
during the ﬁrst transition from stagnation to the post-Malthusian state prove useful.
In this way, rigorous, quantitative examinations of the cross-sectional differences in
theindustrializationprocesscanyieldimportantconclusionsaboutthenatureofearly
development.
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Appendix
Appendix A.1 — Optimization of production
In this section of the appendix we derive the ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) for proﬁt-
maximization of the production side of the model and calculate the demand function
for capital varieties.
Final sector ﬁrms take input and output prices as given. A unit of capital variety
j has value p(j) and is borrowed at the gross interest rate RK. Labor and land are
paid wage w and land rental rate rL, respectively. Final producers solve the following

















subject to the production functions (6) and (7). Capital producing ﬁrms take input
prices as given but set the price of their own output in order to maximize proﬁts. For
given input prices, they solve the cost minimization problem
min
   J
0
RKp(j)ν  (j)dj + wN   − λ   [ν(  )− ν(  )]
 
(18)
subject to the production function (8), where ν(  )is the targeted production amount
of variety    and λ   is a Lagrange multiplier. In the following we derive the ﬁrst order
conditions for problems (16) – (18) and use them to obtain the demand function for
capital varieties.
For agricultural output, Eq. (16) has the FOC
RKp(j) = φν A(j)
−  
1+  AA
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The corresponding FOC for manufacturing production follow from (17)
RKp(j) = ην M(j)
−  
1+  pMAM








M , ∀j (22)
w = (1 − η) pMAM









Finally, the cost-minimization problem (18) of a capital variety producer    implies
RKp(j) = ην   (j)
−  
1+  λ   A  J








   , ∀j (24)
w = (1 − η) λ   A  J
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Note that we have not imposed symmetry of capital variety prices in any of these
derivatives. Rather, we will obtain symmetry in the following steps, which lead to the






















Integrating over all varieties j ∈[ 0,J] yields











N   (27)
where PJ is the price index of existing capital varieties j ∈[ 0,J], given by
PJ ≡






We will need labor demand N   as a function of a given amount of output of variety
  , ν  , later on. To obtain this we plug (27) into the production function (8), which
gives54
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(29)
We then derive the demand for an existing variety j by a producer of a new variety   
by plugging (27) into (26) and substituting N   from (29)
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(30)
Demand for variety j by a producer of a new variety depends on the price of j relative
totheaggregatepriceindexofcapitalvarietiesPJ.Notethatν   denotestheamountof
54 In this step we implicity impose that the constraint in (18) holds with equality, i.e., production is at
its efﬁciency frontier.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 351
the new variety    that is actually produced, whereas ν  (j) is the amount of an existing
variety j used in the corresponding production process. We can now derive the total
cost of producing ν   from (28) to (30):
C   =
  J
0
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w
1 − η
 1−η  
ν   + F
 
(31)
Consequently, the marginal cost of variety    production is given by










≡ MC  J, ∀   (32)
Marginal costs are the same for all capital variety producers   , which is one of the
steps in our derivation of the symmetric equilibrium. We need two more ingredients
to derive total demand for variety j, νd(j): the demand for j by agricultural and by
manufacturing production. Using the FOC (19) – (23) and the production functions
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d   (36)
The ﬁrst two rows in (36) represent total demand for variety j from ﬁnal producers
i ∈[ 0,1] (i.e., from agriculture and manufacturing), and the last row is demand from
currentlyactivenewvariety producers   ∈[ 0,  J]. Notethatthepriceof varietyj enters
  only through the aggregate price index PJ, so that its effect on   is negligible. Con-










where νd(p  ) is the total demand for the new capital variety   . Using (31), (32), and
(35), we obtain the proﬁt-maximizing price as a markup over marginal cost of pro-
duction MC  J, which is the same for each capital variety producer, so that the price of
all newly produced capital varieties in a given period is the same:352 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
p   = (1 +  )MC  J ≡ p  J, ∀   (38)
Freeentryintothecapitalproducingsectorimpliesthateachﬁrm   makeszeroproﬁts,




, ∀   (39)
That is, the amount of each newly produced capital variety, ν(  ), is the same in a given
period, and moreover, is constant over time, even if factor prices and thus marginal
costs change.
Appendix A.2 — Capital varieties and aggregate capital
In the following, we refer to aggregate capital as the collection of all machines avail-





where ν(j) is the amount of capital variety j when it was produced (ν(j) does not
change until j depreciates — it then becomes zero). We choose the ﬁxed cost F such
that F =  . Equation (39), and the fact that ν(j) is constant, imply:
ν(  )= ν(j) = 1, ∀  ,j (41)
Therefore, the amount of each capital variety circulating in the economy (new and
existing ones) is the same. Our choice of F serves to simplify the following analysis
since it implies, together with (40), that
J = K (42)
that is, the total amount of capital in the economy is equal to the number of capital
varieties. Moreover, newly produced capital is given by
   J
0 ν(  )d   =  J. Consequently,
  Jt denotes the mass of capital variety producers as well as the number of varieties that
are produced in period t (but are used for production only from the next period on).
The law of motion for the aggregate capital stock is thus equivalent to the one for
varieties, Jt+1 = (1 − δ)Jt +  Jt. The mass of currently active capital variety producers
can be derived from total investment, I = Y − eN:
  Jt =
It
p  J,t
= Jt+1 − (1 − δ)Jt (43)
According to Eq. (38), the price of all newly produced capital varieties could differ
fromoldvarietiesifmarginalcostsvary.Wethereforeaddtheassumptionthatowners
ofexistingcapitalvarietiesexertthesamemarketpowerasproducersofnewones.All
capital of variety j is owned by one individual or entity (although, of course, different
entities can own different varieties).55 The owner of an existing variety j chooses pj to
maximizepjνd(pj)subjecttoνd ≤ 1,sincetheamountownedofeachjisone.Equation
55 We noted before that existing capital varieties j ∈[ 0,J] are owned by consumers. Our assumption
thus requires that population N be a multiple of the measure of capital varieties J. To circumvent
this problem we can assume that single consumers bring their money to banks and that these act as
proﬁt-maximizing owners of each capital variety.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 353
(35) with  >0 implies that revenue pjνd(pj) is decreasing in the price of j. Therefore,
owners of existing varieties want to charge the smallest possible price at which the
constraint νd ≤ 1 holds. The constraint holds with equality if pj = p  J. Intuitively, if
the owner of an existing capital variety chooses a price above p  J, demand is lower
than unity and part of the variety is wasted. This is not optimal because a marginal
price decrease would raise the revenue and thus proﬁts. On the other hand, if pj < p  J,
demand is larger than unity and the ﬁxed supply of one unit is not sufﬁcient to satisfy
demand. Thus, the price of existing and new capital varieties is the same within each
period. We can now deﬁne the price of capital pK:
p(  )= p(j) ≡ pK, ∀  ,j (44)
Equation (41) establishes symmetry in capital producing sectors. In the following
we slightly abuse notation and use  J as the subscript for a representative new capital
producer as well as for the mass of all producers of new capital varieties. Because the
mass of ﬁnal sector ﬁrms is one, output (YA,YM) and factor inputs (Ni,L,a n dνi(j)
for i = A,M) of a representative ﬁnal producer are equal to aggregate ﬁnal output
and inputs. The price equality of capital varieties j given in Eq. (44), used in (30), (33),
and (34), implies that ﬁrms use the same amount of each variety, i.e., νi(j) = νi, ∀j
and i = A,M,  J. Clearly, the total amount demanded of each variety (i.e., the integral
of νi(j) over all producers i) is also equal for all j: ν(j) = ν. Market clearing of each
existing variety j then requires56
νA + νM +  Jν  J = ν = 1 (45)
where the last equality follows from (41). At the aggregate level all capital, labor, and
land are used in each period. Integrating (45) over all existing varieties j ∈[ 0,J] yields
JνA + JνM + J  Jν  J = Jν = J = K (46)
Recalling that J = K, we can interpret νA, νM,a n d  Jν  J as the aggregate capital shares
in agriculture, manufacturing and variety production, respectively.
Appendix A.3 — Market clearing and equilibrium
The market clearing conditions for single capital varieties and aggregate capital are
given by (45 ) and (46), respectively. The corresponding conditions for labor and land
are:
NA + NM +  JN  J = N (47)
  1
0
Ldi = L (48)
where the latter condition is trivial because land is only used for agriculture by the
[0,1] ﬁnal sector ﬁrms. Market clearing in ﬁnal product markets requires:
NcA = YA (49)
NcM = YM (50)
56 Recall that newly produced varieties are only used from the next period on, but existing varieties
a r eu s e db yt h em a s s  J of new varieties producers.354 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
Beforedeﬁningtheequilibrium,weneedtointroducetotalnominaloutputY,since
thisisthebasisforindividualincomey = Y/N thatentersinconsumers’intertemporal
optimization decision. Let
Y = YA + pMYM + pK  J (51)
where the last term represents the total value of newly produced capital varieties (  Jν,
with ν = 1). This equation, together with (43), J = K, and the condition that con-
sumers’ budget constraints hold with equality (YA + pMYM = eN), implies the law of
motion for capital
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + (1/pK,t)(Yt − etNt) (52)
that is taken into account in the intertemporal optimization (4) by households.57
Deﬁnition 1 GiveninitialvaluesAA,0,N0,K0 =
  J0
0 ν0(j)dj = J0 (sinceν0(j) = 1),and
L,acompetitiveequilibriumconsistsofsequencesfort ≥ 0ofagriculturalTFP,{AA,t};
prices, {pM,t,pK,t,RK,t,rL,t,wt}; ﬁnal sector ﬁrm allocations {YA,t,YM,t,νA,t,νM,t,
NA,t,NM,t,Lt}, capital sector ﬁrm allocations {νt,N  J,t,ν  J,t} for all    ∈[ 0,  Jt] producing
at t; and household allocations {cA,t,cM,t} such that (i) Given the sequence of prices,
ﬁnal sector ﬁrm allocations solve the problems speciﬁed in (16) and (17), and capital
sector ﬁrm allocations solve (18); (ii) Producers of new capital varieties charge the
proﬁt-maximizing price given by (38), and, due to free entry, sell the amount given in
(39) of each variety; (iii) Owners of existing capital varieties charge the price given
by (44); (iv) Given the sequence of prices, consumer allocations maximize (1) subject
to cA,t + pM,tcM,t ≤ et, and consumer consumption expenditures et satisfy the Eul-
er equation (5); (v) The market clearing conditions (45)–(50) hold; (vi) The law of
motion of capital is given by (52); and (vii) Population growth follows (11)–(13).
Appendix A.4 — Aggregate externality representation
In this section we utilize the symmetry of capital variety use in production to derive
a simpliﬁed representation of the model. It offers two advantages: First, the inﬂuence
of aggregate externalities on productivity can easily be represented in the production
functions. Second, with a single assumption about TFP in capital variety production,
we simplify the model such that variety production can be included in the manufac-
turing sector. This reduces the number of equations that must be simulated to solve
the model numerically.
Using νi(j) = νi,∀j and i = A,M,  J in the production functions (6), (7), and (8),
the integral over all capital varieties j ∈[ 0,J] simpliﬁes to Jφ (JνA)φ in agriculture,
Jη (JνM)η in manufacturing, and Jη (Jν  J)η in capital variety production. The terms in
parentheses (Jνi) represent the total capital used in ﬁrm i (i.e., the number of capital
varietiesmultipliedbytheamountutilizedofeachvariety).Itisconvenienttosimplify
notation and label these terms KA ≡ JνA, KM ≡ JνM,a n dK  J ≡ Jν  J. We also use (42)
and set J = K. This implies the following simpliﬁed production functions:














  J − F = ν, ∀   (55)
57 The term (1+γN,t)kt+1 in (4) results from the fact that capital will be divided among (1+γN,t)Nt
household members in the next period.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 355
where N   = N  J,∀   follows from symmetry in variety production and (29).
InthefollowingstepswewillderivetheTFPparamaterA  J asafunctionofAM such
that, despite the ﬁxed cost in capital variety production (55), this sector’s output can
be described by the manufacturing production function (54). First, recall from (39)
that each capital variety producer’s output is F/ . Second, we derive the labor and
capitalvarietyinputneededtoproduceF/  unitsofmanufacturingoutput.Repeating




























Third, we suppose that we want to produce F/  units of a new capital variety    —t h a t
is, using the capital variety technology (55) — with the labor and capital input given in
(56) and (57) — i.e., the inputs needed when applying the manufacturing technology.
F/ 
! = ν(  )= A  JKη   
KM|YM=F/ 
 η  
NM|YM=F/ 
 1−η − F (58)
We now use the corresponding inputs, i.e., (56) and (57) evaluated at YM = F/ .T h i s
yields a constraint on the ratio of A  J and AM:
A  J = (1 +  )AM (59)
The price of capital varieties, as implied by (38), (32), and price symmetry, is then
p  J = (1 +  )
1



















which is equal to marginal cost of manufacturing production, as can be veriﬁed by
calculating total cost CM = wNM + RKKM from (56) and (57) and deriving it with
respect to YM. Due to perfect competition in ﬁnal production, the price of output
equals marginal cost, i.e., pM = MCM. Consequently, (60) implies p  J = pM, and,
using (44) we obtain
pK = pM (61)
By choosing A  J according to (59), each capital variety producer uses exactly the
amounts of labor and capital inputs that a manufacturing ﬁrm would need in order to
produce the same (ﬁxed) output F/  and charges the same price that a manufacturing
producer would request. Intuitively, this result follows because the higher TFP in
variety production exactly offsets the ﬁxed cost F. We can thus incorporate the cap-
ital variety producing sector in the manufacturing sector. The simpliﬁcation follows
independent of our assumption F =   that leads to (41). Also, increasing returns in
variety production imply that the TFP advantage A  J > AM, necessary to compensate
for F, decreases with output ν(  ) . It is therefore crucial that each capital variety ﬁrm
produces a constant amount of output, as follows from (39), such that the necessary
TFP difference is the same for all variety producers and constant over time.
Inadditiontoconsumers’demand,Yd
M,manufacturingmustalsosatisfythedemand
for capital investment, as given by (43).58 Imposing market clearing, the total amount
58 Recall that the new capital produced in a given period is equal to
   J
0 νd   =  J since ν = 1,∀  .356 J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361
of manufacturing supply, YM, must thus equal demand from households and capital






The simpliﬁed model is thus equivalent to a two-sector model where capital invest-
ment goods are produced in the manufacturing sector.
Appendix A.5 — Equilibrium conditions of the 2-sector model
Having derived the two-sector version of the model in the previous section, we now
present the corresponding equilibrium conditions. The FOC for agriculture and man-
ufacturing proﬁt maximization (19) – (23) can be easily simpliﬁed to their symmetric
version by using νi(j) = νi,∀j and i = A,M,  J. The FOC’s are the standard ones cor-
responding to proﬁt maximization of (53) and (54). Factor payments to capital and
labor are equal in both sectors, while land rents are determined in agriculture:
























following, we take per-capita expenditure e as given and solve for the intratemporal
equilibrium. From this solution we obtain pM and RK, which we then use to solve
the Euler Eq. (5). Total demand for agriculture products can be derived from (2):
Yd
A = NcA = N
 
αe + (1 − α)c
 
. The remaining expenditure goes to manufacturing,
which implies Yd
M = NcM = N
 
(1 − α)(e − c)/pM
 
. Total demand for manufacturing
is given by (62). Markets clear for agriculture and manufacturing output:
N
 




















M = YM (67)
All land L is used and factor markets clear:
NA + NM = N (68)
KA + KM = K (69)
Finally, total nominal output, as given in Eq. (51), now simpliﬁes to
Y = YA + pMYM (70)
This gives us a system with 13 unknowns: Y, YA, YM, I, NA, NM, KA, KM, RK, rL,
w, pM, pK; and 13 equations: (61), (63), (68) – (70), and — each of the following
counting twice — (64) - (67). Population growth is then derived from (12) and (13),
where c = cA + cM with cA = YA/N and cM = (pMYM − I)/(pMN).T h i ss y s t e m
of equations characterizes the intratemporal equilibrium. We use the corresponding
solution to derive per-capita expenditures e from the Euler equation in the iterative
process described in the next section.J Econ Growth (2006) 11:319–361 357
Appendix A.6 — Numerical simulations
In this section we outline the simulation of the equilibrium given in the previous sec-












NA and KA, that we solve numerically for given e. Given NA and KA, the remaining
variables can be derived analytically.
To solve the Euler equation (5) we use policy function iteration where expenditure
is a linear function of the (given) per-capita capital at the beginning of a period:
e = ϕk (72)
Wediscretizetheshocksε toagriculturalproductivityusingGaussianquadraturewith




q=1.W eu s eap r o j e c t i o n
method to solve for the coefﬁcient ϕ, as described in the following steps:
1. Initialize by a guess ϕ0 (a small positive number)
2. In iteration l,f o rϕl,c a l c u l a t ee according to (72)
3. For the given e, obtain y = Y/N, γN,a n dpM = pK from the the intratemporal
equilibrium and calculate next period’s population N  = gN









and calculate K  = k N .
5. Evaluate next period’s consumption expenditure e  = ϕk . At all Gaussian quad-
rature nodes q,c a l c u l a t eA 
A,q = z 
qA 
A,w h e r eA 
A = (1 + γA)AA and lnz 
q =
θ lnz + εq
6. For the given N , K , e ,a n dA 
A,q obtain y 
q = Y 
q/N , g 
q,a n dp 
M,q = p 
K,q from
the intratemporal equilibrium for q = 1,...,Q
7. Evaluate expenditure implied by the Euler equation as


















 ψ  
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8. Calculate   ϕ =  e/k
9. If  ϕ −   ϕ  < 10−9, stop the iteration and accept ϕ as a solution. Otherwise use a
Broyden solver to update ϕl+1 and go to step 2. Repeat until convergence.
Appendix A.7 — Calibration of the British birth function
In this section we describe the calibration of the net birth rate function gb(c) based
on British historical data, as shown in Fig. 8. Crucially for our purposes, English
birth rates responded positively to higher wages, as demonstrated by Wrigley and
Schoﬁeld (1981), and Wrigley et al. (1997). To derive the function’s exact shape, we

































Fig. 8 Population growth and wage in England. Sources: Population: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
for 1541–1871; (1971) for 1881–1961. Real wages: Clark (2005)
regression, deﬁning x = w/w0,w h e r ew0 represents the wage in 1700. Population
growth, is yp(xt) = Nt+1/Nt − 1. Let xpeak denote the cutoff-point at which the slope
changes its sign from positive to negative. We then deﬁne a dummy d = 1, whenever
x ≤ xpeak and zero, else. Population growth in 1700 was close to zero; we thus impose
yp(w0/w0) = yp(1) = 0. The spline regression is
yp(x) = β1
 
(x − 1)d + (xpeak − 1)(1 − d)
 
      
x1
+β2 (x − xpeak)(1 − d)
      
x2
+ u (73)
where u is an error term. When running this regression (without constant) we choose
the cutoff-point xpeak to maximize R2, and obtain   β1 = 0.0277(t = 8.03) and   β2 =
−0.0016(t =− 3.39); xpeak = 1.4; the adjusted R2 is 0.70. As in Hansen and Prescott
(2002),weimposethatdemographicgrowthratescannotbenegativebecauseincomes
are too high. For very low income, the net birth rate is zero and population diminishes




max{  β1(x − 1),0}+1, if x ≤ xpeak
max{  β1(xpeak − 1) +   β2(x − xpeak),0}+1,else
(74)
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